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INTRODUCTION 
The Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power to make copyright and patent law in order 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 is one of the 
few provisions of that document explicitly endorsing a utilitarian 
rationale for lawmaking.2 The courts have fallen on a spectrum between 
two extreme approaches to interpreting statutes enacted under this 
clause: (1) nearly entire deference to congressional judgments of what 
promotes progress or (2) strict judicial review of IP statutes in light of 
the constitutionally required goal.3 Deference to Congress’s judgment 
in IP cases accords with the principle of separation of powers,4 but the 
present levels of industry capture that plague Congress suggest that the 
laws as written may hinder progress rather than promote it,5 in 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2.  JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY—CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (3d ed. 2016). 
 3.  Compare Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (using rational basis review to 
uphold a copyright law) and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (similarly using rational 
basis review to uphold a copyright law), with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 
819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (suggesting a progress-oriented approach to 
interpreting copyright statutes) and Golan, 565 U.S. at 345 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] copyright 
is . . . a bounty designed to encourage new production . . . [t]he statute before us, however, does 
not encourage anyone to produce a single new work.”). 
 4.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (“The wisdom of Congress’ action . . . is not within our 
province to second-guess.”). 
 5.  See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 64–65 (2008) (describing conditions likely to 
result in intellectual property policies that hinder the market-based pattern of technological 
progress). 
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contravention of the Constitution’s limitation on Congress’s power to 
make IP law. 
Judicial fidelity to both the IP Clause and separation of powers is 
thus sometimes difficult to maintain. An appropriate middle ground, 
therefore, has been not to use a strict reading of the IP Clause’s stated 
purpose as a stick to strike down IP laws, but to interpret IP statutes so 
that they, in a court’s own reasoned judgment, promote progress.6 This 
method of interpretation helps courts avoid intruding too far into the 
legislative process as they effectuate the constitutional purpose of IP 
law. 
The Supreme Court took advantage of an opportunity to interpret 
an ambiguous statute in a way that promotes progress in Life 
Technologies v. Promega.7 In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the 
Court properly upheld the freedom of manufacturers of unpatented, 
staple articles of commerce to operate within a global supply chain 
without fear of patent infringement liability. To that end, the Court 
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) not to reach the supply of only one of 
the components of a patented invention.8 
This Commentary discusses this case, proceeding in five parts. Part 
One summarizes the facts and procedural background of the case, Part 
Two introduces the basic legal concept of patent infringement and the 
history of § 271(f), Part Three states the holdings of both appellate 
courts, and Part Four states the arguments made by each party before 
the Supreme Court. Part Five explains the Supreme Court’s holding 
and makes an economic policy argument for the Court’s decision as 
opposed to the Federal Circuit’s holding.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Life Technologies manufactures genetic testing kits in the United 
Kingdom for sale worldwide.9 Its kits contain at least five components: 
primer mix, Taq polymerase, PCR reaction mix with nucleotides, buffer 
solution, and control DNA.10 These kits are useful for making extra 
copies of a targeted area of DNA, resulting in a detectable amount of 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (discussing the 
importance of network effects in a determination of whether a computer command menu is 
entitled to copyright protection). 
 7.  Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538 (Feb. 22, 2017). 
 8.  Id. at 11. 
 9.  Id. at 2; Brief for Petitioners at 6, Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538 (Sep. 1, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 10.  Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2. 
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DNA being available for analysis and use in forensic, clinical, or 
research contexts.11 Each of the components must be present for the kit 
to function.12 Taq polymerase, a DNA-copying enzyme, is a staple 
article of commerce13 and can be purchased on Amazon.14 For some of 
the kits, Life Technologies supplied only the Taq polymerase from the 
U.S. and sourced the other components elsewhere.15 
Promega Corporation, a licensee of the patent on the kit 
themselves, had sublicensed the patent to Life Technologies under 
restrictive terms, forbidding the sale of kits for clinical or research use.16 
When Life Technologies sold kits in a manner that violated the license, 
Promega sued in the Western District of Wisconsin for patent 
infringement.17 Life Technologies admitted that their U.S. sales had 
infringed the patent but denied that they had supplied, from the U.S., a 
substantial portion of the components of the kits sold abroad, as they 
had supplied only the Taq polymerase.18 The jury found that Life 
Technologies had infringed the patent and calculated damages based 
on the company’s total worldwide sales, implying that they believed the 
supply of only the Taq polymerase for some of the extraterritorially 
sold kits to be an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).19 The district 
court entered judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) for Life 
Technologies on multiple grounds, one of which was that liability under 
§ 271(f) requires the supply of more than one component.20 On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that substantial evidence 
supported the original jury verdict, and entered judgment accordingly.21 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether 
the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity 
component of a multi-component invention from the United States is 
 
 11.  Id. at 2–3; Brief for Respondent at 5, Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538 (Oct. 24, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 12.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 7. 
 13.  Staple articles of commerce are commodities capable of substantial noninfringing use. 
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (describing the 
“staple article of commerce” doctrine in the copyright context). 
 14.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 7; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 41, Life Techs. 
Corp., No. 14-1538 (argued Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
 15.  Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2–3; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 8. 
 16.  Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 2–3; Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 6. 
 17.  Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 3; Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7. 
 18.  Id. at 8; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 10. 
 19.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
 20.  Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 4; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
 21.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 11. 
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an infringing act under § 271(f)(1).22 A few weeks after oral argument, 
Chief Justice Roberts became aware of a conflict of interest and 
recused himself from the case.23 The case was thus decided by only 
seven justices. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
American patent law grants the holder of a patent the exclusive 
right to make, sell, and use the patented invention within the U.S.24 
Because U.S. patent law largely does not apply extraterritorially, 
anyone seeking to benefit from an invention patented in the U.S. could 
avoid liability by confining their manufacturing, sales, and use to non-
U.S. markets.25 A middle scenario, where a manufacturer makes 
components of an invention in the U.S. but does not make the entire 
assembled invention, led to the passage of § 271(f).26 
Section 271(f) is an exception to the general rule basing 
infringement liability only on conduct within the U.S.27 It was passed 
after the Supreme Court decided Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp.,28 holding that a patentee’s right to “make” an invention was not 
infringed by making each of the components of the invention and 
shipping them abroad for final, trivial assembly.29 Section 271(f)(1) 
closes the loophole revealed by Deepsouth by prohibiting “suppl[ying] 
. . . from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components 
of a patented invention . . . to actively induce the combination of such 
components outside of the United States . . . .”30 Such a supplier will be 
liable only if elements analogous to active inducement of patent 
infringement—knowledge of a valid patent and intent that the patent 
be practiced—are present.31 Since patent law does not apply 
extraterritorially, no act of actual infringement under § 271(a) is 
required for inducement liability under § 271(f)(1). 
 
 22.  Id. at 12. 
 23.  Roberts recuses from patent case after discovering conflict, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 4, 
2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/52f85668c4244c0d8363978876acbf85/roberts-recuses-patent-c 
ase-after-discovering-conflict. 
 24.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 25.  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). 
 26.  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 443–44 (2007). 
 27.  Id. at 442. 
 28.  406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 29.  Id. at 527–28.   
 30.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012). 
 31.  § 271(f)(1) requires that the supplier “actively induce” combination of the components, 
which imports the active inducement standard from § 271(b). Brief for Respondent, supra note 
11, at 34–35. 
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Section 271(f)(1) effectively overruled Deepsouth; it also prohibits 
conduct that is further from classic patent infringement than the facts 
of Deepsouth were, as it provides for liability when less than “all” of the 
components are supplied.32 The statute allows for infringement liability 
based on the supply of “a substantial portion of the components,” not 
just “all” of them, in order to close, rather than move, the loophole.33 
Section 271(f)(2) goes even further: it prohibits the supply of even a 
single component if the component (1) is knowingly specially made or 
adapted for use in the patented invention, (2) is not a commodity with 
substantial noninfringing uses, and (3) is intended to be combined with 
other components to practice the patented invention.34 The legislative 
history indicates, and the text suggests, that § 271(f)(1) is modeled on 
the active inducement provision, § 271(b), and § 271(f)(2) on the 
secondary liability provision, § 271(c).35 
The Supreme Court construed § 271(f) narrowly in Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp.,36 reading it in light of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.37 Even though the statute expressly conditions 
liability on extraterritorial conduct—active inducement requires that 
the induced party actually practice the patent—the presumption 
“remains instructive in determining the extent of the statutory 
exception,” so reading expansive liability into the statute would violate 
the presumption.38 
III. HOLDING 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court, holding 
that one component could be a “substantial portion of the 
components” as required for liability under § 271(f)(1).39 The court 
based its decision on the ordinary meaning of “substantial portion,” 
defining “substantial” to mean “important or essential,” and defining 
“portion” as a “part of a whole.”40 On the facts of the case, evidence 
supported the proposition that Taq polymerase was a “main” and 
“major” component, without which the kits would be inoperable; this 
 
 32.  § 271(f)(1). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2012). 
 35.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 29–30 (discussing the legislative history of § 
271(f)). 
 36.  550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 37.  Id. at 454. 
 38.  Id. at 455–56 (emphasis in original).  
 39.  Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 40.  Id. at 1353. 
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was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Taq polymerase 
was a “substantial portion,” and thus expose Life Technologies to 
damages based on their worldwide sales.41 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.42 Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion for the Court construed the text of § 271(f)(1) to exclude 
supply of only one component, as the district court did.43 The text, 
structure, and history of the statute indicated that Congress intended 
to require the supply of multiple components for liability to attach.44 
 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
1.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
Before the Supreme Court, Life Technologies argued for reversal 
on three grounds: (1) the text and structure of the statute suggest that 
a “substantial portion” approximates “all” and excludes a single 
component; (2) the presumption against extraterritoriality suggests a 
narrow reading of the statute; and (3) the statute was intended to close 
a loophole in classic patent infringement, not impose liability on 
commodity manufacturers based on the worldwide use of their 
commodities in patented inventions.45 
Life Technologies contended that one component is insufficient for 
liability since “substantial” in the statute is quantitative, not 
qualitative.46 Since “substantial portion” follows the quantitative term 
“all,” it should be interpreted in line with the quantitative dictionary 
meanings of “substantial,” and also, contextually, akin to “all.”47 The 
phrase “substantial portion of the components” also suggests a 
quantitative interpretation in a way that alternative drafting 
possibilities, such as “substantial portion of the invention,” would not 
have; “components” being a plural noun suggests that a single 
important component would not be a “substantial portion of the 
components.”48 The following contextual phrase, “where such 
 
 41.  Id. at 1356. 
 42.  Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538, slip op. syllabus at 2–3 (Feb. 22, 2017). 
 43.  Id. at 4, 8. 
 44.  Id. at 8, 10. 
 45.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 12–14. 
 46.  Id. at 16. 
 47.  Id. at 17–18. 
 48.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Life Techs. 
Corp. No. 14-1538. 
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components are uncombined,” also suggests that multiple components 
are presumed to be involved in a “substantial portion.”49 
Life Technologies additionally pointed to the text of § 271(f)(2), 
which expressly provides for liability (under more stringent conditions) 
when a single component is supplied, suggesting that § 271(f)(2) is the 
exclusive avenue for liability based on a qualitatively important, single 
component.50 To hold that § 271(f)(1) could encompass a single, 
qualitatively assessed component would be to render § 271(f)(2) 
surplusage.51 The Supreme Court, in dicta in Microsoft, suggested that 
the two subsections provided for liability based on the supply of 
different and non-overlapping numbers of components, reflecting the 
most natural reading of the statute.52 
Next, Life Technologies argued that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality requires interpreting § 271(f) narrowly, as stated in 
Microsoft.53 This presumption recognizes that U.S. law does not govern 
the world and favors resolving ambiguities in statutes to minimize the 
law’s impact on foreign conduct.54 Because § 271(f) conditions liability 
on the combination of components “outside the United States,” it 
invites the narrow construction that comes with statutes that address 
extraterritorial conduct.55 Therefore, any doubt as to whether a single 
component can be a “substantial portion of the components” should be 
resolved in favor of Life Technologies.56 
Finally, Life Technologies argued that the purpose of § 271(f) is to 
cover conduct similar to conventional patent infringement, not to 
dramatically expand liability to the manufacture of single commodity 
components that are used in patented inventions abroad.57 To expand 
liability thus would chill U.S. manufacturing and result in suppliers 
moving their factories overseas to avoid U.S. patent liability.58 This 
could not be what Congress intended when passing § 271(f). 
 
 49.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 20–21. 
 50.  Id. at 22–23. 
 51.  Id. at 23. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 24. 
 54.  Id. at 25. 
 55.  Id. at 26–27. 
 56.  Id. at 32. 
 57.  Id. at 35–36. 
 58.  Id. at 38. 
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2.  Respondent’s Arguments 
Promega argued for affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s ruling, 
rejecting Life Technologies’ proposed purely numerical interpretation 
of § 271(f)(1), on three grounds: (1) ‘substantial’ can be read 
qualitatively (and should, in this fact-specific inquiry) to support the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling; (2) the presumption against extraterritoriality 
does not apply here, where no liability is imposed based on foreign 
conduct; and (3) Life Technologies’ fears of unfettered liability grinding 
international commerce to a halt ignore the statute’s specific intent 
required for active inducement liability59 
Promega emphasized that the Federal Circuit was merely finding 
substantial evidence to support a jury verdict, and therefore any legal 
conclusions regarding how much of a patented invention must be 
supplied to trigger liability are minimally controlling for future cases, 
as they simply illustrate facets of a comprehensive fact-based inquiry.60 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s specific, quoted rationales for 
reinstating the verdict after the district judge entered a contrary JMOL 
would not necessarily be sufficient to support a finding of infringement 
in another case.61 Even if a defendant supplied a “main” and “major” 
component of a patented invention, without which the device “would 
be inoperable,” these statements are not the test for liability.62 Rather, 
a fact-based inquiry would need to find that the defendant’s 
contribution amounted to a “substantial portion” for liability to 
attach.63 Reading the statute to require this sort of inquiry is consistent 
with the use of the broader term “substantial” as opposed to more 
clearly quantitative terms, such as Life Technologies’ proposed 
construction, “a large percentage closely approximating all.”64 
Promega argued that a broad reading of “substantial” is also 
consistent with the statute’s history and purpose, which was to expand 
liability beyond both classic patent infringement and the facts of 
Deepsouth, not to restrict it.65 The legislative history indicates that § 
271(f)(1) was modeled on the active inducement provision, § 271(b), 
while § 271(f)(2) parallels the contributory infringement provision, § 
 
 59.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 2–4. 
 60.  Id. at 42–43. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 18, 40. 
 65.  Id. at 27. 
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271(c).66 The crucial difference between the two provisions—the reason 
for finding liability under one provision and not the other—is thus the 
relevant specific intent required, not the number of components 
involved.67 Since there is overlap between classic active inducement 
and contributory infringement liability, there is no good reason to read 
§ 271(f)(2) as excluding the possibility of § 271(f)(1) liability for the 
supply of a single component.68 
The requirement of active inducement also limits the potential 
commodity-supplier liability that Life Technologies suggested would 
be the result of the Federal Circuit’s holding.69 Since intent is required 
for active inducement, only a showing of knowledge of the patent, and 
intent to supply components and induce the other to practice the patent 
abroad, would lead to liability.70 Promega asserts that such liability is 
rare, and that the Federal Circuit’s decision to recognize such liability 
two years ago has not led to a flood of patent litigation targeting 
commodity suppliers.71 Promega also criticizes Life Technologies’ 
proposed bright-line rule as inviting new loopholes involving multiple 
suppliers, with each supplying a single component of a patented 
invention for assembly abroad.72 
Promega also argued that the active inducement requirement limits 
the applicability of the presumption against extraterritoriality.73 Since 
what is regulated is domestic conduct done with the specific intent to 
induce foreign practice of a patent, and no liability is imposed on an 
actor based on that actor’s foreign conduct, the presumption does not 
operate to narrow the statute.74 Moreover, Life Technologies’ proposed 
rule would not operate to shield manufacturers that make multiple, 
trivially significant commodity components, at least two of which could 
be used in a patented invention, from liability, whereas a qualitative 
reading of “substantial” could avoid unwanted liability in this 
scenario.75 
 
 66.  Id. at 29. 
 67.  Id. at 30. 
 68.  Id. at 31–32. 
 69.  Id. at 34. 
 70.  Id. at 35. 
 71.  Id. at 37. 
 72.  Id. at 40. 
 73.  Id. at 44–45. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 40. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
Life Technologies was correct that imposing liability based on the 
supply of only one component would likely increase costs on American 
manufacturers who supply components for global markets, contrary to 
Congress’s probable intent. Life Technologies’ textual arguments were 
in better accord with the text and structure of the statute, and the 
precedential background of the case favored Life Technologies as well. 
At oral argument, the Justices seemed to favor Life Technologies’ 
construal of the statute; at times, multiple Justices misstated the 
relevant statutory language as “all or substantially all,” Life 
Technologies’ preferred interpretation, rather than the actual phrase 
“all or a substantial portion.”76 So it is little surprise that Life 
Technologies prevailed. 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court dispensed with the case 
purely on non-policy statutory-interpretation grounds. The Court 
accepted Petitioners’ argument that “substantial” is quantitative and 
“components” is plural in the context of the statute.77 The Court cited 
the structure of the statute as evidence that multiple components are 
required for liability under § 271(f)(1).78 The Court also referenced the 
historical context of the enactment of § 271(f), which indicates that it 
was intended to close the Deepsouth loophole.79 The Court declined, 
however, to adopt Life Technologies’ preferred interpretation of the 
statute: its narrow holding, that § 271(f)(1) liability could not attach to 
supply of only a single component,80 leaves open the possibility of 
liability for supplying multiple components that do not amount to “a 
large percentage closely approximating all” of the invention.81 In doing 
so, the Supreme Court continued its recent pattern of replacing the 
Federal Circuit’s pro-patent, bright-line tests with fuzzy, flexible 
standards.82 
 
 76.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 20, 36, 44. 
 77.  Life Techs. Corp., No. 14-1538, slip op. at 8. 
 78.  Id. at 8–9. Section 271(f)(2) requires extra conditions to attach liability for supplying a 
single component. Id. 
 79.  Id. at 10–11. Justices Thomas and Alito did not join this part of the otherwise-unanimous 
opinion, as in their view the history of the statute was unhelpful for answering the question 
presented. Id. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 80.  Id. at 11. 
 81.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 4. 
 82.  Although the Supreme Court’s holding firmly excludes liability for supply of one 
component, it is unclear where precisely the line is between one component (no liability) and all 
of them (clear liability). Life Techs. Corp., slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring). In contrast, the 
Federal Circuit’s proposed case-by-case analysis, while inherently flexible and fact-specific, would 
likely have resulted in a jury issue on substantiality whenever a defendant produced a necessary 
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Of late, the Supreme Court has taken an interest in the Federal 
Circuit’s pro-patent jurisprudence and has now reversed in nine of the 
last eleven cases it has heard on appeal from that court.83 The Federal 
Circuit, pursuing its purpose of creating a single body of uniform and 
predictable patent case law, has often taken a highly formalistic 
approach to the patent statutes.84 It has also interpreted these statutes 
in favor of broad patent validity and strong patent rights.85 The 
Supreme Court has rejected some of the Federal Circuit’s tests for 
patentability in recent years (e.g., the machine-or-transformation test 
in Bilski) without replacing them with anything nearly as predictable.86 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in this case contained some of these 
same highly pro-patent and formalistic features. The opinion cited 
dictionary definitions of “substantial” and “portion,” as well as 
example evidence from the trial transcript to support the jury’s 
reasonable conclusion conclusion that Life Technologies’ Taq 
polymerase was an important part of the kits, and gave no 
consideration to the purpose of the statute.87 The effect of opening up 
manufacturers of staple commodities to patent liability for their 
worldwide sales, as long as they knew their overseas buyers were 
practicing U.S. patents, was apparently not considered. 
Such an imposition of liability would contravene the purpose of 
patent law, which exists “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts,”88 by restricting the free flow of information and goods in 
and out of the United States in a way that does not efficaciously 
incentivize innovation. It is generally accepted that the free exchange 
of goods, services, and information internationally promotes 
innovation,89 so any restriction in the form of a patent monopoly must 
 
component of a patented invention. See Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353–
54 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 83.  See John Duffy, Argument preview: Is there a substantial chance the justices will affirm 
the Federal Circuit’s reading of “substantial”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-is-there-a-substantial-chance-the-justices-will-affirm-
the-federal-circuits-reading-of-substantial/. 
 84.  John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003). 
 85.  Id. at 772. 
 86.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010); see Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court 
and § 101 Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject-Matter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea 
Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 631 (2014) (describing this pattern in the Bilski case). 
 87.  Promega Corp., 773 F.3d at 1353–54. 
 88.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 89.  Stephen Ezell, The Relationship between Trade and Innovation, BRIDGES (May 15, 
2013), http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/volume-37-may-15-2013/item/8106-the-relationship 
-between-trade-and-innovation. 
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be justified in terms of its providing an incentive to innovate that would 
not otherwise have existed.90 The extra incentive is not present here. 
The Federal Circuit’s reading of § 271(f)(1) would have imposed 
excessive costs on manufacturers and international suppliers relative to 
the benefits to patent holders. Under this reading, every export of a 
commodity component used overseas in a patented invention could 
give rise to a jury issue of patent infringement unless the manufacturer 
has shut its eyes to whether any of its buyers are practicing U.S. 
patents.91 Usually, the patent monopoly extends only to the practice of 
the entire invention within the U.S.; this reflects a set of congressional 
judgments about the proper reach of U.S. patent law and how much of 
an incentive is necessary to prompt innovation.92 Reading § 271(f) as a 
massive rather than minor expansion of patent rights changes this 
carefully struck balance between incentives for initial innovation and 
public access to innovative materials. And it does this without good 
evidence that this was Congress’ intent. 
Section 271(f) is already unusual within patent law in providing for 
secondary infringement liability in the absence of an act of direct 
infringement.93 To be sure, persons abroad must practice the patent for 
liability to attach, but such practice does not qualify as infringement 
when done outside the borders of the U.S.94 This provision makes sense 
if the conduct prohibited is thought tantamount (or nearly so) to the 
conduct prohibited by the conventional direct- and secondary-
infringement provisions in § 271(a)–(c). Congress’s purpose in enacting 
§ 271(f) seems to have been to close the Deepsouth loophole without
opening any other loopholes further down the line, such that conduct
that avoids liability under § 271(f) genuinely bears little resemblance
to patent infringement. Exporting a commodity component, even with
knowledge of a patent and intent that the recipient make a patented
invention abroad, is not tantamount to making the whole invention, or
most of it, yourself.
90.  See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 345 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
copyright laws must incentivize the creation of new works to be constitutional). 
91.  See supra notes 51, 52, 64 and accompanying text.
92.  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441, 455 (2007) (explaining the role
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in patent law). 
93.  See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(“[L]iability for inducement must be predicated on direct infringement.”); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1),
(2) (2012) (addressing assembly “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States”).
94.  Id. § 271(a).
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Allowing cases involving a single commodity export to go to juries 
for a case-specific analysis of substantiality could decrease the 
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing by increasing the risk of 
infringement and thus the cost of manufacturing in the U.S. Many U.S. 
patents employ preexisting commodities as components of the 
inventions they claim. A U.S. manufacturer seeking to avoid a high 
settlement-value guaranteed jury trial must remain ignorant of either 
the business of their buyers or the patent landscape.95 Both are bad 
business moves: the former because some patented inventions can be 
licensed in a way that adds value to many companies, and the latter 
because ignorance of business partners’ business exposes the 
manufacturer to unforeseen risks. Congress would not have intended 
to make simple commodity manufacturers eschew these best practices 
just to avoid patent liability. 
Avoiding these pitfalls, the Court adopted the district court’s 
construction of the statute as excluding liability for supply of a single 
component. This construction allows liability for conduct tantamount 
to domestic patent infringement without leaving ordinary suppliers 
unduly exposed. This holding makes good grammatical sense of the 
statute and correctly interprets § 271(f)(1) in accordance with the 
constitutionally mandated purpose of patent law. 
CONCLUSION 
Hard cases make bad law.96 Life Technologies was a particularly 
egregious infringer vis-a-vis the kits it sold in the U.S.97 So it is 
understandable that the Federal Circuit, when confronted with a 
judgment as a matter of law for an actor who had clearly violated 
Promega’s rights, would seek to quickly dispense with minor, 
problematic issues, such as the scope of the phrase “substantial portion 
of the components,” and let the initial jury verdict stand. But explicitly 
allowing the sort of liability for foreign shipments that the Federal 
Circuit allowed here would harm U.S. manufacturing. In this era of 
relatively easy offshoring and friendly foreign manufacturing 
destinations, this policy would drive commodity suppliers beyond the 
reach of U.S. patent law rather than secure their license payments as 
proper monopoly rents for our next generation of innovators. The 
 
 95.  Even ignorance may not be sufficient if there is evidence that the supplier was willfully 
blind. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 
 96.  N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7. 
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Supreme Court thus rightly limited this liability, excluding 
manufacturers who supply just a single commodity component from 
the statute’s scope. 
